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Abstract
The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) pushed state
obligations to counter prejudice and stereotypes concerning
people with disabilities to the forefront of international
human rights law. The CRPD is underpinned by a model of
inclusive equality, which views disability as a social construct
that results from the interaction between persons with
impairments and barriers, including attitudinal barriers, that
hinder their participation in society. The recognition dimen-
sion of inclusive equality, together with the CRPD’s provi-
sions on awareness raising, mandates that states parties tar-
get prejudice and stereotypes about the capabilities and
contributions of persons with disabilities to society. Certain
human rights treaty bodies, including the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and, to a much lesser
extent, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, require states to eradicate harmful stereo-
types and prejudice about people with disabilities in various
forms of interpersonal relationships. This trend is also reflec-
ted, to a certain extent, in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights. This article assesses the extent to
which the aforementioned human rights bodies have elabo-
rated positive obligations requiring states to endeavour to
change ‘hearts and minds’ about the inherent capabilities
and contributions of people with disabilities. It analyses
whether these bodies have struck the right balance in elabo-
rating positive obligations to eliminate prejudice and stereo-
types in interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, it high-
lights the convergences or divergences that are evident in
the bodies’ approaches to those obligations.
Keywords: CRPD, Disability Discrimination, ECHR, Stereo-
types, Interpersonal Relations
1 Introduction
Ensuring effective protection against discrimination,
including combating ingrained prejudice and stereo-
types, is at the core of the quest to guarantee respect for
* Andrea Broderick is Assistant Professor at the Universiteit Maastricht,
the Netherlands.
human dignity. Adopting the lens of stereotyping
enables one to look beyond ‘intentional, negative beha-
viours’ that underpin different forms of prejudice
‘towards the (often) unintentional beliefs, assignment of
certain roles and hierarchical orderings that structure
our societies along different lines’, according to
Möschel.1
People with disabilities not only face countless disabling
barriers in the built environment, but they also face dis-
ablist attitudes in both private and public life, hindering
their ability to participate in mainstream society. Miller
et al. define disablism as ‘discriminatory, oppressive, or
abusive behavior arising from the belief that disabled
people are inferior to others’.2 Discrimination against
people with disabilities often results from ignorance and
false assumptions and can manifest in ‘aversive disabl-
ism’ – subtle, unintentional prejudice – according to
Deal.3
Prejudices and stereotyping often arise in the context of
interpersonal relationships. These relationships can be
classified as connections between private parties with
varying degrees of proximity, arising, inter alia, in the
family and social spheres, in the educational and
employment spheres or in the field of healthcare.
International and regional human rights law has long
paid attention to ‘prejudice’ and ‘stereotypes’. The first
reference to both of those terms in binding United
Nations (UN) law is in Article 5(a) of the UN Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
1. M. Möschel, ‘Racial Stereotypes and Human Rights’, in E. Brems and A.
Timmer (eds.), Stereotypes and Human Rights Law (2016) 119, at 120.
For similar definitions of ‘stereotypes’ and ‘prejudice’, see J.F. Dovidio,
M. Hewstone, P. Glick & V.M. Esses, ‘Prejudice, Stereotyping and
Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview’, in John F. Dovidio
et al. (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discri-
mination (2010) 3, at 5-9.
2. P. Miller, S. Parker & S. Gillinson, Disablism: How to Tackle the Last
Prejudice (2004), at 9; see also F. Campbell, Frontiers of Ablism (2009);
and P. Harpur, ‘Sexism and Racism, Why Not Ablism?: Calling for a
Cultural Shift in the Approach to Disability Discrimination’, 35(3) Alter-
native Law Journal 163 (2009). ‘Ablism’ is a preferred term by certain
researchers, as it focuses not only on disability but the formation of
abledness, which is always in relationship with disability:
www.coe.int/en/web/compass/disability-and-disablism#19 (last visited
1 April 2020).
3. M. Deal, ‘Aversive Disablism: Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People’,
22(1) Disability & Society 93, at 93 (2007).
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against Women (CEDAW).4 In addition, Article 7 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)5 requires that
states parties combat prejudice.
It was not until the entry into force of the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),6
and the mandate of the Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee), that state
obligations to counter prejudice and stereotypes against
people with disabilities were pushed to the forefront of
international human rights law, becoming ‘a growing
area of interest within the UN’.7 Other UN bodies, such
as the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee),
have acknowledged the existence of compounded dis-
ability stereotyping.8 Moreover, regional bodies, such as
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have
increasingly taken note of disability as a human rights
issue.
While much has been written about prejudice and ster-
eotypes in the disability context,9 and some attention
has been paid in the legal literature to the issue of dis-
ability prejudice and stereotypes in interpersonal rela-
tionships,10 these issues have not yet been analysed from
the perspective of the jurisprudence of the UN treaty
bodies and the ECtHR in the context of the CRPD’s
model of inclusive equality. That model of equality
views disability as a social construct that results from
the interaction between persons with impairments and
barriers, including attitudinal barriers, that hinder their
participation in society.
Against the backdrop of the CRPD’s model of inclusive
equality, this article assesses the extent to which the
aforementioned bodies have elaborated positive obliga-
tions to protect and fulfil disability rights, requiring
states to endeavour to change ‘hearts and minds’11 about
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession
by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979.
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by
General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965.
6. UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December
2006, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106, Annex I.
7. S. Cusack, ‘Building Momentum Towards Change: How the UN’s
Response to Stereotyping is Evolving’, in E. Brems and A. Timmer,
above n. 1, at 19.
8. See, for instance, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discri-
mination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), General Recommen-
dation 25, UN Doc. A/59/38, Annex I (2004), para. 12.
9. See, for instance, P. Hunt, Stigma: The Experience of Disability (1996).
See also M.L. Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial
(2000). See also J. Morris, Pride Against Prejudice: Transforming Atti-
tudes to Disability: A Personal Politics of Disability (1991); and C.
Friedman, ‘The Relationship between Disability Prejudice and Disability
Employment Rates’, 65(3) Work 591 (2020).
10. See, among others, R.J. Bonnie and J. Monahan (eds.), Mental Disor-
der, Work Disability, and the Law (1997); See also P.D. Blanck (ed.),
Employment, Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues
in Law, Public Policy and Research (2000).
11. See Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka. See also M. Perlin, ‘My Sense of Humanity Has Gone Down
the Drain: Stereotypes, Stigma and Sanism’, in E. Brems and A. Timmer,
above n. 1, at 104.
the inherent capabilities and contributions to society of
people with disabilities. It analyses whether the relevant
bodies have struck the right balance or overstepped the
mark and whether any fragmentation12 or convergence13
is evident in their respective approaches. In terms of its
scope, this article primarily addresses jurisprudence
which relates to prejudice and stereotypes that occur in
relations between private parties, but it also discusses
disablism, which – directly or indirectly – affects the
exercise of the rights of people with disabilities in the
aforementioned interpersonal spheres.
This article is rooted in legal doctrinal methodology.14
In that regard, it is ‘descriptive, evaluative and critical’15
of the most relevant legal sources. The selection of juris-
prudence was made by inputting the terms ‘stereo*’,
‘prejudice’ and ‘disability’ in the databases of the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Universal Human Rights Index and Human Rights
Documentation (HUDOC).16 In addition, the article
takes account of other jurisprudence related to disability
discrimination and associated legal literature.
Following the introductory remarks, Section 2 of this
article discusses horizontal positive obligations in inter-
national and regional law. Section 3 addresses the
CRPD’s theoretical framework – that of inclusive equal-
ity – and its distinctive features related to prejudice and
stereotyping. That section also analyses the extent to
which the issues of prejudice and stereotyping related to
disability have been mainstreamed in other UN treaty
bodies. Section 4 then examines the relevant case law
decided under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR),17 while Section 5 highlights the frag-
mentation or convergence that is evident in the respec-
tive approaches of the bodies examined. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 Horizontal Positive
Obligations in International
and Regional Law
Since much of this article analyses jurisprudence which
relates to prejudice and stereotypes that occur in rela-
tions between private parties, this section sets out the
12. See UN General Assembly, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficul-
ties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law.
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2016), at 245.
13. See generally M. Andenas and E. Bjorge (eds.), A Farewell to Fragmen-
tation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (2015).
14. H.T. Emerson and F.B. Cross, ‘What is Legal Doctrine’, 100(1) North-
western University Law Review 517, at 518 (2005).
15. A. Broderick, The Long and Winding Road to Equality and Inclusion for
Persons with Disabilities: The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (2015), at 14.
16. Searches were updated to 26 February 2020.
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Rome, 4.XI.1950.
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horizontal positive obligations that are incumbent on
states under international and regional law.
2.1 Regulating Discrimination in the Private
Sphere in International Human Rights Law
As highlighted elsewhere,
[w]hile enforcement mechanisms for international
human rights law18 address themselves solely to
States, the doctrine of horizontal application of
human rights law has developed,19
acknowledging state party responsibility for discrimi-
nation perpetrated by non-state actors. Nowak contends
that
the primary significance of protection against discri-
mination lies in the obligation on States Parties to
provide effective protection against discrimination by
private parties to those subject to their laws.20
Article 4(1)(e) CRPD is modelled closely on Article 2(e)
CEDAW,21 in that it requires states parties to the
CRPD to ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of disability by any person,
organization or private enterprise’. The CRPD also con-
tains explicit references to action to be taken by private
actors in Articles 9(2)(b), on accessibility; 21(c), on free-
dom of information and expression; 25(d), on health and
27(1)(h), on employment.
It is evident that the foregoing treaties prohibit discrim-
inatory conduct in market-based private relationships,
such as in access to employment or goods and services.
Notwithstanding this, one cannot automatically assume
that this extension of state responsibility to private
actors also applies to interactions in the sphere of inti-
macy – pertaining (among others) to private, social and
family life.
Henrard submits that the CERD does not impose posi-
tive obligations ‘to prevent and eradicate private discri-
mination in a comprehensive way that would reach
every interaction between private persons’.22 This con-
tention needs to be considered in light of the CRPD,
which has taken a step further into the sphere of intima-
cy than previous international human rights law. In that
regard, Article 23 CRPD (on respect for the home and
family) requires states parties to ‘take effective and
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
persons with disabilities in all matters relating to mar-
riage, family, parenthood and relationships’.23
18. With the exception of international criminal law.
19. See generally P. Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2004).
20. M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary (2005), at 632.
21. See also Art. 2(1)(d) CERD.
22. K. Henrard, ‘Non Discrimination and Full and Effective Equality’, in M.
Weller (ed.), Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the Jurispru-
dence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies (2007), at 143.
23. See also Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD
Committee), Bacher v. Austria, UN Doc. CRPD/C/19/D/26/2014, para.
9.2.
2.2 The Troubled Relationship of the Strasbourg
Court with Horizontal State Responsibility
The drafters of the ECHR did not intend the Conven-
tion to extend to relationships between private individu-
als.24 Notwithstanding this, the Strasbourg Court has
affirmed the existence of horizontal positive obliga-
tions,25 with a view to giving ‘practical’ effect to certain
provisions of the Convention.26 By means of the well-
established margin of appreciation doctrine, however,
the Court leaves wide discretion to national authorities
with regard to positive duties. It is ‘conscious of the lim-
its of its mandate and endeavours to respect national
resource allocation policies’.27 As de Schutter points
out, the difficulty in interpreting the socio-economic
dimensions of ECHR rights lies in identifying ‘the pre-
cise scope of the positive obligations which may be
imposed on the State’.28 In particular, when positive
obligations are substantive (rather than procedural) in
nature, there is a particular need to balance colliding
rights and freedoms and to respect the restrictions or
limitations applying to ECHR rights.29
It is indisputable that the ECHR diverges significantly
from UN treaties, and particularly from the CRPD, in
terms of the ratione materiae of the rights and obliga-
tions contained therein. While the CRPD is a group-
specific treaty that ‘contains widespread positive duties
[spanning] both civil and political as well as economic,
social and cultural rights’, the ‘fundamental aim of the
ECHR is to protect civil and political rights’.30 More-
over, the ECHR places ‘primarily negative restraints on
governmental action and does not contain any specific
provisions for the protection of the rights of persons
with disabilities’,31 although it has been interpreted as
covering disability.32
24. See generally L. Urbaite, ‘Judicial Activism in the Approach of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to Positive Obligations of the State’, 11
Baltic Yearbook of International Law 214 (2011).
25. See generally A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European
Court of Human Rights (2004).
26. M. Florczak-Wator, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights
in Promoting Horizontal Positive Obligations of the State’, 17(2) Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review 39, at 40 (2017). See generally
L. Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive State: Rethinking the Relation-
ship between Positive and Negative Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights (2016), at 50-53.
27. A. Broderick, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and the European Convention on Human Rights: A Tale of Two Halves
or a Potentially Unified Vision of Human Rights?’, 7(2) Cambridge
International Law Journal 199, at 206 (2018). See generally D. Xenos,
The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention
on Human Rights (2012).
28. O. de Schutter, ‘Reasonable Acommodation and Positive Obligations in
the European Convention on Human Rights’, in A. Lawson and C.
Gooding (eds.), Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice
(2005), at 45.
29. See generally J. Gerards, General Principles of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (2019).
30. With the exception of the First Protocol to the ECHR (concerning the
right to property and the right to education). Broderick (2018), above n.
27, at 202.
31. Broderick (2018), above n. 27, at 202-3. See Art. 5(1)(e) ECHR, con-
cerning the lawful detention of ‘persons of unsound mind’.
32. Glor v. Switzerland, ECHR (2009), Application no. 13444/04.
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In recent years, the Strasbourg Court has elaborated a
‘burgeoning disability jurisprudence on the non-discri-
mination norm’.33 However, in the sphere of relation-
ships between private parties, the Court wavers in terms
of imposing positive obligations on states. Furthermore,
the ECtHR has recognised that state obligations are not
absolute, particularly concerning the extent to which
human rights are to be respected in relations between
private parties. In that regard, the Court often resorts to
the ‘fair balance’ test.34 In other words, in determining
whether a positive obligation exists, the Court holds that
a fair balance must be struck between the interests of the
community on the whole and the interests of the indi-
vidual.35
Overall, one must question how far the international
and regional treaty-monitoring bodies are prepared to
reach into the sphere of interpersonal relations, both in
instances involving prejudice and stereotypes perpetra-
ted by private actors and those perpetrated by profes-
sionals (such as psychiatrists) or individuals linked to
the state (such as judges) that affect the interpersonal
relations of people with disabilities. Furthermore, the
question remains as to what types of measures can be
effective in changing hearts and minds towards people
with disabilities and in ensuring inclusive equality. The
following sections reflect on these questions.
3 The UN Treaty Bodies:
Addressing Prejudice and
Stereotypes
3.1 The UN CRPD: A Treaty of Paradigm Shifts
The adoption of the CRPD on 13 December 2006, and
its entry into force on 3 May 2008, represents the ‘high-
water mark’36 concerning the protection of the rights of
persons with disabilities in international human rights
law. O’Cinneide argues that the CRPD adopts ‘a partic-
ular conceptual view’ of the state’s role, whereby states
parties bear various positive obligations spanning all
human rights, designed to ensure the provision of a
minimum level of support to persons with disabilities
that is compatible with their inherent dignity.37 Stein
notes that the CRPD challenges the traditional gap
between civil and political rights, and socio-economic
33. D. Ferri and A. Broderick, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and
the “Human Rights Model of Disability”: Convergence, Fragmentation
and Future Perspectives’, European Yearbook on Human Rights (2019),
at 276.
34. Gerards, above n. 29, at 154 et seq.
35. See, among many others, Hatton v. United Kingdom, ECHR (2003),
Application no. 36022/97.
36. A. Broderick and D. Ferri, International and European Disability Law
and Policy: Text, Cases and Materials (2019), at 311.
37. C. O’Cinneide, ‘Extracting Protection for the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities from Human Rights Frameworks: Established Limits and New
Possibilities’, in O.M. Arnardóttir and G. Quinn (eds.), The UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandina-
vian Perspectives (2009), at 164.
rights.38 Moreover, scholars claim that by blurring the
distinction between these traditional categories of rights,
the CRPD has resulted in increasing the range of posi-
tive obligations that reach into both the public and pri-
vate spheres.39 In that connection, de Beco confirms
that the CRPD ‘has generated a new understanding of
the indivisibility of human rights’.40
3.1.1 The Theoretical Framework of the UN CRPD
The CRPD endorses the paradigm shift from the outda-
ted medical model of disability – which perceives of the
inability of people with disabilities to participate in
society as the ‘inevitable result of their own impairment
rather than as a consequence of any disabling and dis-
criminatory barriers in society’41 – to the ‘social-contex-
tual model’ of disability.42 The CRPD’s version of the
social model43 views disability as an interaction between
persons with impairments and widespread barriers in
society (physical barriers, as well as legal and attitudinal
barriers, among others) and has been described as ‘a
bulwark against disablism’.44 The primary focus of the
CRPD is on the elimination of barriers through positive
measures such as individualised reasonable accommoda-
tions45 – modifications that are needed or requested by a
particular individual in a specific case, such as extra
time in an examination or the adjustment of working
facilities – and generalised (group-based) anticipatory
accessibility measures.46
Article 2 CRPD sets out a wide definition of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability, highlighting that such
discrimination includes the denial of a reasonable
accommodation. The accommodation duty is subject to
a defence or limitation, whereby the duty bearer is not
required to provide an accommodation where to do so
would impose a disproportionate or an undue burden.
Degener suggests that while a social model approach to
disability explains how disability arises and sheds light
on the marginalisation of people with disabilities, it does
not offer adequate solutions to overcome it.47 The sub-
stantive provisions of the CRPD go beyond the social-
contextual model, to endorse the human rights model of
38. M.A. Stein, ‘Disability Human Rights’, 95 California Law Review 75, at
75 (2007).
39. Broderick (2018), above n. 27, at 207.
40. G. de Beco, ‘The Indivisibility of Human Rights in Light of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, 68(1) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 141, at 160 (2019).
41. Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at 1.
42. Ibid., at 77.
43. Several authors claim that the ‘pure’ social model focuses on societal
barriers and neglects the role of impairment in disabling individuals: see
T. Shakespeare and N. Watson, ‘The Social Model of Disability: An Out-
dated Ideology?’, 2 Research in Social Science and Disability 9 (2001).
44. A. Dimopolous, ‘An Enabling Interpretation of the Refugee Convention:
Determination of Refugee Status in Light of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, in B. Burson and David J. Cantor
(eds.), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition: Comparative Legal
Practice and Theory (2016) 253, at 258.
45. See Arts. 2 and 5(3) CRPD.
46. See Art. 9 CRPD.
47. T. Degener, ‘A New Human Rights Model of Disability’, in V. Della Fina,
R. Cera & G. Palmisano, (eds.), The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Commentary (2017) 41, at 41.
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disability.48 The latter model lays emphasis on the
human dignity of persons with disabilities and values
impairments as part of human diversity.49 The human
rights model also conceives of disability as ‘one of sever-
al layers of identity’, requiring states parties to address
intersectional disadvantage.50 Quinn and Degener clari-
fy that the end goal of the human rights model ‘is to
build societies that are genuinely inclusive, societies that
value difference and respect the dignity and equality of
all human beings regardless of difference’.51
3.1.2 Peering through the Lens of Inclusive Equality:
Recognising Inherent Abilities
The human rights model is mirrored in the CRPD’s
mandate of inclusive equality,52 which has been defined
by the CRPD Committee as a ‘new’ model of equality
developed through the CRPD’s provisions.53 According
to the Committee, the inclusive equality model goes
beyond a substantive model of equality, by embracing
four intertwined dimensions:
i. An accommodating dimension: to make space for
difference as a matter of human dignity
ii. A fair redistributive dimension: to address socio-
economic disadvantage
iii. A participative dimension: to reaffirm the social
nature of people as members of social groups and
the full recognition of humanity through inclusion
in society
iv. A recognition dimension: to combat stigma, stereo-
typing, prejudice and violence and to adequately
take into account the dignity of human beings and
their intersectionality.54
The recognition dimension of inclusive equality is
reflected in the transversal provision on awareness rais-
ing in Article 8 CRPD, termed an obligation of ‘social
engineering’.55 Article 8 CRPD requires that states par-
ties adopt immediate,56 effective and appropriate meas-
ures to raise awareness, including at the family level,
regarding persons with disabilities.57 It also requires
states parties to combat stereotypes, prejudices and
harmful practices related to persons with disabilities,
including those based on sex and age, in all areas of
life.58 Measures envisaged by the CRPD to foster
48. CRPD Committee, General Comment 6, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/6
(2018), para. 9. See also Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at 26-28.
49. Degener, above n. 47, at 47.
50. CRPD Committee, above n. 48, para. 9.
51. G. Quinn and T. Degener, Human Rights and Disability, Human Rights
and Disability (2002), at 14. See also General Principle 3(d) CRPD.
52. CRPD Committee, above n. 48, para. 11.
53. Ibid. In connection with the CRPD Committee’s model of inclusive
equality, see the parallels with the analysis of equality in Broderick
(2015), above n. 15, and with Sandra Fredman’s four-dimensional
model of transformative equality: S. Fredman, Discrimination Law
(2011).
54. CRPD Committee, above n. 48, para. 11.
55. C. Tobler, The Limits and Potential of the Concept of Indirect Discrimi-
nation (2008).
56. Interestingly, Art. 8 is the only CRPD provision to require the adoption
of ‘immediate’ measures.
57. Art. 8(1)(a) CRPD.
58. Art. 8(1)(b) CRPD.
respect for the rights of people with disabilities include
promoting recognition of their skills, merits and abilities
and their contribution to the workplace;59 fostering an
attitude of respect at all levels of the education system,
including in all children from an early age;60 encourag-
ing all organs of the media to portray persons with disa-
bilities in a manner consistent with the CRPD61 and
promoting training programmes.62
Education is an important tool in countering intolerance
and fostering understanding. In that connection, Article
8(2)(b) CRPD echoes the requirement under Article 24
CRPD to ensure an inclusive educational system, which
is targeted, inter alia, towards the ‘the full development
of human potential and sense of dignity and self-worth,
and the strengthening of respect for human rights, fun-
damental freedoms and human diversity’.63 By ensuring
inclusion of individuals with various types of impair-
ments in educational systems, disability becomes part
and parcel of human diversity, and that, in turn, can be
reflected in educational curricula.
Article 8 CRPD is also closely intertwined with the non-
discrimination norm (in Arts. 2 and 5 CRPD), which
has been described as the ‘leitmotif’ of the CRPD.64 The
non-discrimination principle cuts across both civil and
political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights,
as do its corresponding obligations. Moreover, the
CRPD prohibits multiple and intersectional discrimi-
nation, in Article 6 thereof.
Overall, the CRPD embraces a model of equality which
seeks to target deep-rooted structural inequalities by
advocating legal tools, including individualised support
measures for people with disabilities, to enable them to
live independently in their communities,65 to participate
in mainstream education66 and on the open labour mar-
ket67 – thereby normalising disability in everyday life
and targeting all forms of disablism.
Another recognition duty is found in Article 12 CRPD,
which accords individuals with disabilities equal recog-
nition before the law (legal capacity), meaning that they
have the right to legal standing and legal agency.68 Per-
ceived or actual deficits in mental capacity (‘unsound-
ness of mind’ or other discriminatory labels) cannot be
employed to justify a denial of legal capacity, according
to the CRPD Committee.69 Article 12 CRPD envisages
the shift from the substitute decision-making paradigm
(guardianship or other) to one that is based on support-
ed decision-making.70 This means that all forms of
59. Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) CRPD.
60. Art. 8(2)(b) CRPD.
61. Art. 8(2)(c) CRPD.
62. Art. 8(2)(d) CRPD.
63. Art. 24(1)(a) CRPD.
64. O.M. Arnardóttir, ‘A Future of Multidimensional Disadvantage Equali-
ty’, in O.M. Arnardóttir and G. Quinn, above n. 37, at 41.
65. Art. 19 CRPD.
66. Art. 24 CRPD.
67. Art. 27 CRPD.
68. CRPD Committee, General Comment 1, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1
(2014), para. 12.
69. Ibid., para. 13.
70. Ibid. On the ‘best interests standard’ and its compatibility with the
CRPD, see generally P. Gooding, A New Era for Mental Health Law and
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guardianship are outlawed under the CRPD, and the
best interests standard – which is inherently paternalis-
tic71 and based on prejudice and stereotypes that people
with disabilities are incapable – can no longer be used as
a justification for depriving them of their decision-mak-
ing abilities. In fact, the CRPD Committee is of the
view that all individuals, no matter how severe their
impairment, have ‘universal legal capacity’.72 Moreover,
Article 12(3) CRPD requires states parties to provide
persons with disabilities with the necessary supports to
make decisions and exercise their legal capacity in
accordance with their will and preferences.73 Arstein-
Kerslake and Flynn note that
an individual’s ‘will’ is used to describe the person’s
long-term vision of what constitutes a ‘good life’ for
them.74 The term ‘preferences’, on the other hand,
tends to refer to likes and dislikes, or ways in which a
person prioritises different options available to
them.75
Notably, the CRPD Committee’s interpretation of cer-
tain provisions, particularly that on legal capacity, has
not been without controversy.76 The Committee’s inter-
pretation of the right to legal capacity has been consid-
ered contentious by some scholars, who argue that it
seems to go ‘further than recommending governments
end guardianship’ and ‘calls on countries to abolish
mental health laws’.77 Other scholars seem to imply that
support may not be a feasible option for certain individ-
uals with disabilities.78
3.1.3 The CRPD Committee: Hitting the Right Target or
Aiming Wide of the Mark in Ruling on Prejudice and
Stereotypes?
This subsection examines the decisions, concluding
observations and general comments of the CRPD Com-
mittee that pertain to prejudice and stereotyping in
interpersonal relationships, with a view to delineating
the trends that are evident in the Committee’s jurispru-
dence from the perspective of positive duties.
Policy: Supported Decision-Making and the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2017), at 129 et seq.
71. M. Donnelly, ‘Decision Making for Mentally Incompetent People: The
Empty Formula of Best Interests?’, 20 Medical Law Journal 405 (2001).
72. CRPD Committee, above n. 68, para. 25.
73. Ibid., para. 17.
74. A. Arstein-Kerslake and E. Flynn, ‘The General Comment on Article 12
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Road-
map For Equality Before the Law’, 20(4) The International Journal of
Human Rights 471, at 471 (2016). CRPD Committee, above n. 68,
para. 21. See also Art. 12(4) CRPD.
75. Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, above n. 74, at 471.
76. See the comments at www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/crpd/pages/
dgcarticles12and9.aspx (last visited 1 April 2020).
77. See J. Craigie, M. Bach, S. Gurbai, A. Kanter, S.Y.H. Kim, O. Lewis & G.
Morgan, ‘Legal Capacity, Mental Capacity and Supported Decision-
Making: Report from a Panel Event’, 62 International Journal of Law
and Psychiatry 160, at 160 (2019).
78. M. Browning, C. Bigby & J. Douglas, ‘Supported Decision Making:
Understanding How Its Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity Is Influencing
the Development of Practice’, 1(1) Research and Practice in Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities 34 (2014).
Using the search terms indicated in Section 1, three rel-
evant individual communications were identified.
One example of a decision in which the CRPD Commit-
tee reached into the interpersonal sphere is X v. Tanza-
nia, decided in 2017.79 The author of that individual
communication, Mr. X, had his left arm cut off by two
strangers at the age of 41 due to his condition of albin-
ism.
The CRPD Committee considered that the domestic
authorities had not acted with due diligence, having
failed to take the necessary measures to ensure ‘an effec-
tive, complete and impartial investigation and prosecu-
tion of the perpetrators’.80 Accordingly, the Committee
found that the state party had violated Articles 5 (on
non-discrimination); 15 (on freedom from torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) and 17 CRPD
(on respect for integrity).81
A parallel finding of discrimination was made by the
CRPD Committee a year later in Y v. Tanzania,82 in
circumstances that were largely similar to those in the
decision of X.
The authors of both communications alleged disability-
based discrimination because i) the violence in question
was a generalised practice in the state party that only
affects people with albinism and ii) the impunity
connected to the acts
characterises most cases of violence perpetrated
against persons with albinism, as the State party’s
authorities considered that such violence is linked to
witchcraft, which is a generally accepted cultural
practice with regard to which a lot of prejudice still
prevails in society.83
In both decisions, the CRPD Committee prescribed
both training and awareness-raising measures designed
to address ‘harmful practices and rampant myths’
affecting the rights of individuals with albinism,84 and
also called for the criminalisation of such practices85 and
the adaptation of legal frameworks ‘to ensure that they
encompass all aspects of attacks against persons with
albinism’.86 This reflects, perhaps, the Committee’s
awareness of the limitations of educational measures
alone and the view that some coercive measures are nec-
essary in this context.
Endeavouring to change hearts and minds by invoking
the tool of criminal law is a solution that is open to ques-
tion.87 Not only is persistent harassment at the
interpersonal level difficult to police, necessitating
79. CRPD Committee, X v. Tanzania, Communication No. 22/2014, UN
Doc. CRPD/C/18/D/22/2014 (2017).
80. Ibid., para. 8.2.
81. Ibid., para. 8.6.
82. CRPD Committee, Y v. Tanzania, Communication No. 23/2014, UN
Doc. CRPD/C/18/D/23/2014 (2018).
83. See paras. 8.2 of X v. Tanzania and Y v. Tanzania.
84. See paras. 9(b)(iv) of X v. Tanzania and Y v. Tanzania.
85. See paras. 9(b)(iii) of X v. Tanzania and Y v. Tanzania.
86. See paras. 9(b)(i) of X v. Tanzania and Y v. Tanzania. Emphasis added.
87. See, among others, L. Piggott, ‘Prosecuting Disability Hate Crime: A
Disabling Solution’, 5(1) People, Place & Policy Online 25 (2011).
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coordinated action at various levels of government, but
institutional prejudices that are already embedded in a
given culture are extremely difficult to overcome. In
that regard, law can serve to pull hearts and minds in
one direction, but embedded cultural traditions or
religion can influence one’s affective and cognitive fac-
ulties to such an extent that they essentially pull hearts
and minds in the opposite direction. Moreover, crimin-
alisation can suppress minds to the reality of the experi-
ence of disability (albinism in this case), rather than
opening minds to becoming more tolerant. In addition,
legislation targeting hate crime underlines the problem
‘as caused by the individual who goes out in public’,88
thereby reinforcing culturally embedded ideas of nor-
mality and disability.89 This can lead to institutionalised
stigmatisation and ‘othering’ and may also entrench
aversive disablism. Furthermore, prescribing a criminal
law remedy ignores the manifold barriers that people
with disabilities face in the criminal justice system gen-
erally,90 and especially in one that is probably also stee-
ped in cultural prejudices.
Another area in which people with disabilities are great-
ly stigmatised concerns the exercise of their legal capaci-
ty. Legal capacity considerations relate closely to the
interpersonal sphere, since many important decisions
taken by, or in respect of, people with disabilities are
adopted in that sphere. In 2013, the CRPD Committee
handed down an individual communication on legal
capacity, in which it deliberated indirectly on prejudices
stemming from private individuals (professionals)
deciding on the issue of guardianship. While the sub-
stance of the case of Bujdosó and others91 did not relate to
the interpersonal sphere itself – concerning instead the
placement of individuals with intellectual disabilities
under partial or plenary guardianship regimes pursuant
to various judicial decisions, and the ensuing denial of
their right to vote – certain aspects of the case are none-
theless noteworthy in the context of prejudice and ster-
eotyping, and those aspects will be elaborated on in a
later section of this article.92
The third-party interveners in Bujdosó emphasised that
restricting the right to vote on the basis of disability
constitutes direct discrimination and is ‘predicated on
the unacceptable and empirically unfounded stereotype
that all persons with disabilities are incapable’.93 In ren-
dering its decision, the CRPD Committee took note of
the interveners’ claims that ‘the professionals who par-
ticipate in the assessment process, such as judges, psy-
chologists, psychiatrists and social workers, are not
immune to such prejudice’.94 Taking into account these
arguments, the Committee made clear that no individual
88. Ibid., at 28-29.
89. Ibid., at 25.
90. See generally E. Flynn, Disabled Justice?: Access to Justice and the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2017).
91. CRPD Committee, Zsolt Bujdosó and Others v. Hungary, Communica-
tion No. 4/2011, UN Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 (2013).
92. See Subsection 4.4.
93. CRPD Committee, Zsolt Bujdosó and Others v. Hungary, above n. 91,
para. 5.4.
94. Ibid., para. 5.11.
with a disability should be forced to undergo an assess-
ment of voting capacity by social workers, psychologists
or others as a precondition for participating in elections
and that states parties should put in place all requisite
positive measures of support.95
In terms of the CRPD Committee’s concluding observa-
tions,96 Cusack notes that, between 2011 and 2014, there
were a ‘small but growing number’ of concluding obser-
vations issued by the Committee in relation to prejudice
and stereotypes.97 Up until that point, the Committee
had emphasised the importance of states adopting edu-
cation and training measures (the obligation to fulfil/
promote human rights), as well as implementing policies
to combat stereotypes and prejudices and to promote
the dignity, capabilities and contributions of people with
disabilities.98 Cusack notes that the inclusion of recom-
mendations related to policy initiatives
demonstrates an awareness of the broad-ranging and
holistic measures needed to challenge stereotyping
and, in this, reflects lessons learned from the
CEDAW Committee’s evolving jurisprudence on
stereotyping.99
The CRPD Committee has also paid particular atten-
tion to the need to challenge the stereotypical view of
individuals with disabilities as being vulnerable or
‘objects of charity’ and, therefore, in ‘need of protec-
tion’.100
Since 2014, an ever-increasing number101 of concluding
observations issued by the CRPD Committee urge
states parties to ‘promote positive perceptions’ about
people with disabilities through campaigns targeting the
general population, the private sector and educational
institutions.102 The Committee also recommends that
states parties include organisations of persons with disa-
bilities ‘when developing and delivering nationwide
campaigns, awareness-raising programmes or training
on the human rights model of disability’.103 Further-
95. Ibid., para. 10(b)(2). The Committee also seems to have (implicitly)
rejected the ECtHR’s finding in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (Alajos Kiss v.
Hungary, ECHR (2010), Application no. 38832/06) that disenfranchise-
ment could be acceptable if an individualised assessment of voting
capacity is carried out: CRPD Committee, Zsolt Bujdosó and Others v.
Hungary, above n. 91, para. 5.4.
96. See a similar analysis of States’ concluding observations in Henrard, in
this volume, in the context of Islamophobia.
97. Cusack, above n. 7, at 20.
98. Ibid., citing, among several others, CRPD Committee, Concluding
Observations: Peru, UN Doc CRPD/C/ PER/CO/1 (2012), para. 19.
99. Cusack, above n. 7, at 20.
100. Ibid. citing, among others, CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations:
Austria, UN Doc. CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1 (2013), para. 22.
101. From the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2014, the term stereotype
(search term ‘stereo*’) was mentioned 9 times in Concluding Observa-
tions. From the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2019, it was men-
tioned 58 times. From the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2014, the
term prejudice (search term ‘prejudice’) was mentioned once in Con-
cluding Observations. From the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2019,
it was mentioned 8 times.
102. CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Turkey, UN Doc.
CRPD/C/TUR/CO/1 (2019), para. 18(d).
103. CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc.
CRPD/C/POL/CO/1 (2018), para. 14(b).
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more, the Committee suggests that states parties imple-
ment ‘innovative’ public awareness-raising and educa-
tional programmes104 for all relevant actors, including
the media, judges and lawyers, the police, social workers
and the general public, with the aim (inter alia) of
addressing the language used in connection with people
with disabilities, including women with disabilities.105
As outlined above, Article 8 CRPD acknowledges that
the media plays a significant role in awareness raising.106
Bariffi asserts that the requirement in Article 8 CRPD
‘includes not only the use of the media to broadcast spe-
cific disability-centred campaigns but also the way the
whole media content portrays persons with disabili-
ties’.107 The media plays a fundamental role in challeng-
ing both direct and aversive disablism, by increasing
representation of people with disabilities in all aspects of
society. However, Bariffi contends that an analysis of
state party reports shows
a clear trend, namely, that there are no general, nor
mainstreamed, policies effectively implemented at
domestic level, but rather isolated and disconnected
initiatives or actions to raise social awareness as pro-
vided by article 8.108
In terms of the CRPD Committee’s general comments,
it has been asserted that the Committee missed ‘key
opportunities’ to address issues of stereotyping in its
early general comments.109 By its third general com-
ment on women and girls with disabilities in 2016, how-
ever, the Committee deliberated quite extensively on
compounded stereotyping.110 Later general comments
urge states parties to put in place
specific rules relating to evidence and proof to ensure
that stereotyped attitudes about the capacity of per-
sons with disabilities do not result in victims of
discrimination being inhibited in obtaining redress.111
This reflects, perhaps, the Committee’s implicit
acknowledgement of the limitations of educational
measures alone and the requirement for states parties to
adopt a wide range of measures aimed at changing
hearts and minds.
104. CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc.
CRPD/C/NOR/CO/1 (2019), para. 14.
105. Ibid.
106. On the role of the media, see also Art. 17 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
107. F. Bariffi, ‘Analysis and Commentary of Article 8 on Awareness-Raising
of the UN-CRPD’, in M.A. Stein, I. Bantekas & D. Anastasiou (eds.), The
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A
Commentary (2018), at 254.
108. Ibid., at 242.
109. Cusack, above n. 7, citing CRPD Committee, above n. 68, in which the
terms ‘stereotypes’ and ‘prejudice’ are not mentioned.
110. CRPD Committee, General Comment 3, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/3
(2016), paras. 8, 17(e), 30, 38, 46 and 47.
111. CRPD Committee, Genernal Comment 6, above n. 48, para. 31(e).
3.1.4 Evidence of Disability Mainstreaming in the UN
Treaty Bodies?
Degener claims that ‘it would be contrary to the harmo-
nization of international human rights law as well as to
the mainstreaming112 of disability’ in human rights law
if the CRPD’s model of inclusive equality were not
applied broadly across the other UN bodies when deal-
ing with disability claims.113
An advanced search conducted on the Universal Human
Rights Index database revealed two decisions on dis-
ability stereotyping – one issued by the CEDAW Com-
mittee114 and one by the CERD Committee115 – after
the entry into force of the CRPD. It is noteworthy that
neither of these decisions concerned prejudice and ster-
eotyping between private parties, but the decision of
R.P.B. v. Philippines116 nonetheless reveals important
lessons regarding the extent to which the UN treaty
bodies (should) ensure consistency in ruling on the
rights of persons with disabilities in general, and specifi-
cally the right to non-discrimination.
R.P.B. related to a complaint brought before the
CEDAW Committee by a Deaf girl who was raped by
her neighbour. The applicant complained that the deci-
sion of the domestic court constituted discrimination
under Article 1 CEDAW (the non-discrimination norm)
and also under the CEDAW Committee’s General Rec-
ommendations 18 and 19, related to women with disa-
bilities and violence against women, respectively.117 The
applicant alleged a failure of the state party to comply
with its obligation to effectively protect women against
discrimination in line with Article 2(c), (d) and (f)
CEDAW. In that regard, it was claimed that the trial
court ‘relied on gender-based myths and stereotypes’,118
failing ‘to consider the rape in the context of her vulner-
ability as a [D]eaf girl’.119
The CEDAW Committee appeared to (implicitly) con-
cur with the author of the communication, namely, that
the domestic court had reasoned with ‘manifest preju-
dice’ against her as a Deaf minor victim.120 The Com-
mittee ruled that the judges viewed the author as an
incredible witness and applied notions of how an ‘ordi-
nary Filipina female rape victim’ should behave in the
circumstances.121 Similarly to the obligations prescribed
112. See K. Skarstad and M.A. Stein, ‘Mainstreaming Disability in the United
Nations Treaty Bodies’, 17(1) Journal of Human Rights 1 (2018).
113. T. Degener, General Comment No. 6 of the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 16 May 2018, Berkeley
Comparative Disability Rights – webinar, cited in L. Waddington and A.
Broderick, Combatting Disability and Realising Equality: A Comparison
of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and EU
Equality and Non-Discrimination Law (2018), at 45.
114. CEDAW Committee, R.P.B. v. Philippines, Communication No.
34/2011, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (2014).
115. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Pjetri v. Switzer-
land, Communication No. 53/2013 UN Doc. CERD/C/91/D/53/2013
(2017).
116. CEDAW Committee, R.P.B. v. Philippines, above n. 114.
117. Ibid., para. 3.1.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., paras. 3.8 and 8.9.
121. Ibid., para. 8.9.
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by the CRPD Committee, the CEDAW Committee pre-
scribed a review of legislation surrounding rape,122 as
well as the provision of ‘adequate and regular training’
to the judiciary and legal professionals, so as to ensure
that stereotypes and gender bias do not affect court pro-
ceedings and decision-making.123
Atrey remarks that R.P.B provides a useful example of
how the CEDAW Committee’s evaluative work ‘can be
channeled towards understanding and responding to
[the] intersectional nature of gender violence with the
perspective of intersectional integrity’.124 However,
despite the petitioner’s invocation of the CRPD, the
CEDAW Committee did not mention the CRPD in its
decision. Notably, in finding that there was ‘double
discrimination’ (rather than specifying whether it relat-
ed to intersectional or multiple discrimination specifi-
cally), the CEDAW Committee referred to its own
General Recommendation No. 18, which describes
women with disabilities as a ‘vulnerable group’.125 This
is a term that the CRPD Committee (mostly) avoids126
and, as will be demonstrated in Section 4, the issue of
language used by courts and treaty-monitoring bodies is
an important one in seeking to avoid the perpetuation of
stereotypes and prejudice.
4 The ECtHR: Treading Lightly
through Unchartered
Waters?
Since the entry into force of the CRPD, disability has
featured increasingly as a human rights issue in Stras-
bourg. In the wake of Glor v. Switzerland,127 in which
the Court stated that national authorities have a consid-
erably reduced margin of appreciation with regard to
disability discrimination, the ECtHR confirmed explic-
itly for the first time in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary128 the
application of a standard of ‘strict scrutiny’129 in the
context of disability.
Article 14 and Protocol 12 to the ECHR protect against
discrimination, inter alia, on the basis of disability. It is
well established that Article 14 ECHR cannot be
invoked independently; rather, it is accessory to sub-
stantive ECHR rights.130 According to Arnardóttir, ‘the
key milestones in the development towards a more
122. Ibid., para. 9(b)(i).
123. Ibid. para. 9(b)(iv).
124. S. Atrey, ‘Lifting as We Climb: Recognizing Intersectional Gender Vio-
lence in Law’, 5 Oñati Socio-legal Series 1512, at 1525 (2015).
125. CEDAW Committee, R.P.B. v. Philippines, above n. 114, para. 8.3.
126. The only mention of vulnerability by the CRPD Committee is in the
cases of X v. Tanzania, at para. 8.4 and in Y v. Tanzania, at paras. 8.4
and 8.5. The notion of ‘vulnerability’ is used to describe the vulnerabili-
ty of the authors of the communications as a result of the attacks and
the failure to punish those, rather than describing people with disabili-
ties themselves as vulnerable.
127. See, among others, Glor v. Switzerland, above n. 32.
128. Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, ECHR (2010), Application no. 38832/06.
129. Ibid., para. 44.
130. Inze v. Austria, ECHR (1987), Application no. 8695/79, para. 36.
robust substantive equality guarantee’ are recognising
indirect discrimination, the right to reasonable accom-
modation and positive obligations to protect and fulfil
rights.131 Some of those aspects of protection from
discrimination are evident in the ECtHR’s case law. In
the sphere of education, for instance, the Strasbourg
Court has been increasingly willing to impose reasona-
ble accommodation duties on contracting states to the
ECHR, as will be demonstrated below. With regard to
positive obligations to protect and fulfil disability rights
across a range of ECHR provisions, the Strasbourg
Court has wavered in its approach, as will be illustrated
by analysing several post-CRPD cases that are relevant
to disability discrimination, and particularly to prejudice
and stereotypes in the interpersonal sphere.
4.1 The Duty of Reasonable Accommodation
and Ensuring Access to Inclusive Education
Inclusive education is one way in which intergroup con-
tact can be stimulated in the interpersonal sphere, and it
provides a setting in which the (wrongful) assumptions
underlying aversive disablism can be counteracted.
Much has been written about stimulating affective ties
between members of the dominant group and the
minority ‘outgroup’132 through creating intergroup con-
tact, particularly in the sphere of race relations.133 How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that while increasing
intergroup contact can serve to strengthen affective ties,
it may not always have an impact on cognitive processes
related to prejudice and stereotypes.134 Nonetheless, as
Bariffi asserts:
[T]he right to inclusive education not only allows
persons with disabilities to fulfil their right to educa-
tion but it also allows other children without disabili-
ties to raise awareness and understanding of disability
as part of diversity in a natural inclusive environ-
ment.135
Certain cases of the Strasbourg Court acknowledge the
benefits of inclusive education and deliberate on the
obligations of contracting states to facilitate inclusion
through providing reasonable accommodations.
In the 2016 decision of Çam v. Turkey,136 the Court
found a violation of both Article 14 and Article 2 of Pro-
tocol No. 1 to the ECHR (on the right to education) fol-
lowing the refusal of the Turkish National Music Acad-
emy to enrol the applicant due to her visual impairment.
The ECtHR focused on the importance of positive
measures to ensure that students with disabilities enjoy
education on a non-discriminatory basis and considered
131. O.M. Arnardóttir, ‘Vulnerability under Article 14 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights Innovation or Business as Usual?’, 4(4) Oslo
Law Review 150 (2017).
132. See generally T.F. Pettigrew and L.R. Tropp, When Groups Meet: The
Dynamics of Intergroup Contact (2011).
133. W.C. Byrd, Poison in the Ivy: Race Relations and the Reproduction of
Inequality on Elite College Campuses (2017), at 12.
134. See generally Pettigrew and Tropp, above n. 132.
135. Bariffi, above n. 107, at 253.
136. Çam v. Turkey, ECHR (2016), Application no. 51500/08.
121
Andrea Broderick doi: 10.5553/ELR.000166 - ELR July 2020 | No. 3
that discrimination on the ground of disability extends
to the refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation, in
line with the CRPD.137 This was despite the fact that
the applicant had not requested a reasonable accommo-
dation from the domestic authorities.138 In essence, the
ECtHR held that by refusing to enrol the applicant
without accommodating her disability, the domestic
authorities had prevented her, without any objective
justification, from exercising her right to education.139
In a later case, Enver Şahin v. Turkey,140 the Strasbourg
Court went even further than it had done in Çam to
assess the suitability of the accommodation measures
proposed to the applicant with a disability,141 who – fol-
lowing an accident – was unable to access the building
of Firat University on account of the lack of adapted
facilities. In finding a violation of both Article 14 and
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR,142 the Court
noted that ensuring inclusive education forms part of
the international responsibility of states.143 The ECtHR
furthermore confirmed that Article 14 ECHR must be
read in light of the CRPD’s reasonable accommodation
duty.144 In that regard, the Strasbourg Court held that
the university in question had failed to look for alterna-
tive solutions that would have enabled the applicant to
study under conditions as close as possible to those pro-
vided to students without disabilities, without imposing
an undue or disproportionate burden on the entity con-
cerned.145
While the Şahin judgment has been deemed to consti-
tute ‘a strong endorsement of the right to inclusive edu-
cation’ contained in the CRPD,146 in the more recent
case of Stoian v. Romania147 the ECtHR demonstrated a
more cautious approach in terms of enunciating the pos-
itive obligations of the state to facilitate access for indi-
viduals with disabilities to mainstream education,
resorting instead to the state’s margin of appreciation.
In that connection, the ECtHR ruled that national
authorities are ‘better placed than an international court
to evaluate local needs and conditions in this regard’.148
137. Ibid., para. 67. See J. Damamme, ‘Disability Discrimination because of
Denial of “Reasonable Accommodations”: A Very Positive Connection
between the ECHR and the UNCRPD in Çam v. Turkey’, Strasbourg
Observers, 01 April 2016, https://strasbourgobservers.com/category/
cases/cam-v-turkey/ (last visited 1 April 2020).
138. J. Damamme, ‘Disability and University (Pragmatic) Activism: The Pros
and Cons of Enver Şahin v. Turkey’, Strasbourg Observers, 09 March
2018.
139. Çam v. Turkey, above n. 136, para. 69.
140. Enver Sahin v. Turkey, ECHR (2018), Application no. 23065/12.
141. A. Broderick, Case Note: Enver v. Sahin, Verbod op discriminatie op
grond van handicap, Recht op onderwijs, VN-Gehandicaptenverdrag,
‘Doeltreffende aanpassingen’, European Human Rights Cases EHRC
2018/106, EHRM 30-01-2018.
142. See Enver Sahin v. Turkey, above n. 140, para. 75.
143. Ibid., para. 62.
144. Ibid., para. 67.
145. Ibid., para. 72.
146. O. Lewis, ‘Strasbourg Case: Disabled Student Excluded from University
Education’, Doughty Street Chambers, 02 February 2018, https://
insights.doughtystreet.co.uk/post/102epfy/strasbourg-case-disabled-
student-excluded-from-university-education (last visited 1 April 2020).
147. Stoian v. Romania, ECHR (2019), Application no. 289/14.
148. Ibid., para. 109. See also Çam v. Turkey, above n. 136, para. 66.
Referring to the ‘fair balance’ test,149 the Court ruled
that the domestic authorities had complied with their
obligation to provide reasonable accommodation and
had acted within the applicable margin of apprecia-
tion,150 despite indications by the domestic courts that
the authorities had not taken adequate measures to facil-
itate the applicant’s access to education.
A similarly reticent approach was demonstrated by the
ECtHR in the 2019 case of Dupin v. France,151 where
the Strasbourg Court took another step back from the
more positive trends regarding inclusive education that
were evidenced in Çam and Enver Şahin. Importantly,
in Dupin, the CRPD152 was deemed ‘notable by its
absence’ – at least there was no real engagement with
the UN Convention.153
The more recent case law on education of the Stras-
bourg Court is therefore less encouraging in terms of
facilitating intergroup contact in line with the CRPD’s
inclusive education provisions and provides less hope in
terms of tackling the root causes of the aversive, and
other forms of, disablism that pervade society. Indeed,
as Deal points out, not endorsing inclusion can result in
the fact that
well-meaning social policies that reduce the possibili-
ty of meaningful interactions between disabled people
and others are therefore likely to be supported by
aversive disablists, for instance: supporting segrega-
ted schooling due to the belief that it can offer a high-
er quality education to disabled children.154
4.2 The Stance of the Strasbourg Court on
Disability Hate Crime
Another area in which the issue of disability prejudice
and stereotypes has come before the Strasbourg Court is
in relation to hate crime. At the end of 2012, the ECtHR
decided for the first time, in Ðordević v. Croatia,155 that
the state’s failure to protect against long-term, persis-
tent harassment on the basis of disability and ethnic ori-
gin violated the ECHR.
Ðordević concerned two Croatian nationals of Serbian
origin. The second applicant was the mother of, and
full-time carer for, a man – Dalibor (the first applicant)
– who was severely mentally and physically disabled.
The applicants complained that they had been harassed,
both physically and verbally, over a period of four years
by children living in their neighbourhood, who commit-
ted ‘a number of brutal acts’ against the first appli-
cant.156 The second applicant brought the matter to the
149. See Stoian v. Romania, above n. 147, para. 97.
150. Ibid., para. 110.
151. Dupin v. France, ECHR (2019), Application no. 2282/17.
152. For reference to the CRPD, see para. 12 of the judgment.
153. J. Lievens and M. Spinoy, ‘Dupin v. France: The ECtHR Going Old
School in Its Appraisal of Inclusive Education?’, Strasbourg Observers,
11 February 2019, https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/02/11/
dupin-v-france-the-ecthr-going-old-school-in-its-appraisal-of-inclusive-
education/#more-4304 (last visited 1 April 2020).
154. Deal, above n. 3, at 96.
155. ECtHR, Ðordević v. Croatia, ECHR (2012), Application no. 41526/10.
156. Ibid., para. 24.
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attention of the police (among other authorities), who
interviewed the children concerned,157 but concluded
that they were too young to be held criminally responsi-
ble.158
The Strasbourg Court considered the first applicant’s
complaint under Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition of
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment), recog-
nising that positive obligations under that Article are
not absolute and that they must ‘be interpreted in a way
which does not impose an impossible or disproportion-
ate burden on the authorities’.159 The Court balanced
the obligations inherent in Article 3 with the guarantees
in other ECHR articles, which ‘legitimately place
restraints on the scope of [state] action to investigate
crime and bring offenders to justice’.160 Balancing all
considerations, the ECtHR denounced the Croatian
authorities for having taken ‘no relevant action of a gen-
eral nature to combat the underlying problem’ in spite
of the fact that they knew that the first applicant had
been ‘systematically targeted and that future abuse was
very likely to follow’.161 The Court paid specific atten-
tion to the lack of policy decisions and monitoring
mechanisms to prevent further harassment, and the lack
of counselling put in place for the benefit of the first
applicant,162 (seemingly) implying that these types of
positive measures are required under the obligation to
protect human (disability) rights.
In addition, the ECtHR held that the level of disruption
caused to the second applicant’s private life and ‘acts of
ongoing harassment’163 directed towards her son trig-
gered the application of Article 8 ECHR (the right to
respect for private and family life), under which con-
tracting states have a positive obligation to ‘ensure
respect for human dignity’.164 This is similar to what
Liebenberg terms ‘treatment as an equal’165 and demon-
strates a substantive model of equality in action within
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.
Notably, even though the ECtHR had cited Article 5
CRPD (on non-discrimination) and Article 8 CRPD (on
awareness raising) as relevant UN legal materials,166 the
complaint under Article 14 ECHR was dismissed, since
the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies. It
is unfortunate that the Strasbourg Court did not have
the opportunity to consider the application of the non-
discrimination norm in Ðordević and to elaborate on
positive measures in that context, particularly in light of
the later judgment in Skorjanec v. Croatia,167 in which
the Court found racist hate crime (leading to discrimi-
157. Ibid., paras. 14-15.
158. Ibid., para. 20.
159. Ibid., para. 139.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., para. 148.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid., para. 153.
164. Ibid., para. 152.
165. S. Liebenberg, ‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-
Economic Rights’, 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, at 14
(2005).
166. Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155, para. 79.
167. Skorjanec v. Croatia, ECHR (2017), Application no. 25536/14.
nation by association) to be in breach of Article 14
ECHR.
It is noteworthy that, in Ðordević, the third-party inter-
vener – the European Disability Forum – claimed that
fear of difference is ‘nourished’ only when the potential
victim is perceived as ‘vulnerable’.168 Vulnerability (or
perceived vulnerability) is often at the root of hate
speech and hate crime, and it is acknowledged by some
scholars169 that the construction of individuals with dis-
abilities as vulnerable subjects has ‘weakened the impe-
tus’170 for the introduction of hate crime legislation and
prevents courts and law enforcement authorities from
identifying crimes as hate crimes per se. According to
Roche, it also leads to the risk of facilitating the types of
arguments advanced by the government in Ðordević,
namely, ‘that Dalibor had engaged in risky behaviour in
light of his own vulnerability’171 by going outside on his
own or that his mother had failed in caring for him by
allowing him to go outside on his own.172
The vulnerable groups approach173 has rightly been
viewed by some authors as a means of addressing struc-
tural inequalities. Peroni and Timmer argue that the
ECtHR’s use of the concept of ‘group vulnerability’
represents a crucial step towards an enhanced anti-
discrimination case law …. The Court’s use of the
term ‘vulnerable groups’… does something: it
addresses and redresses different aspects of inequality
in a more substantive manner.174
While this contention has considerable merit, it must be
acknowledged that the concept of ‘vulnerability’ does
‘not sit particularly well with the disability rights agen-
da’.175 The Strasbourg Court has applied vulnerability
analysis in several disability cases, beginning with Alajos
Kiss,176 linking it to the ‘considerable discrimination’177
that individuals with (certain types of) disabilities – psy-
168. Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155, para. 133.
169. See A. Roulstone and H. Mason-Bish, ‘Between Hate and Vulnerability:
Unpacking the British Criminal Justice System’s Construction of Disablist
Hate Crime’, 26(3) Disability and Society 351 (2012). See also the
arguments made in Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155, para. 131.
170. See Roulstone and Mason-Bish, above n. 169, at 351.
171. M. Roche, ‘Failure to Stop Disability Harassment’, 9 October 2012,
www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/adult-social-care/307-adult-care-
features/11934-failure-to-stop-disability-harassment (last visited 1 April
2020).
172. See Roche, above n. 171. See also Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155,
para. 130.
173. See generally A. Timmer, ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for
the European Court of Human Rights’, 11(4) Human Rights Law
Review 707 (2011).
174. L. Peroni and A. Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emer-
gent Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law’, 11 Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law 1056 (2013). Emphasis in origi-
nal.
175. Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at 320. See also the arguments by Maria
Roche, who points out that,
“to assume ‘vulnerability’ is an inherent and unchanging characteristic
of disabled people is to discriminate against them, is disempowering
and sails close to a flawed conceptualisation of disability as weakness”:
Roche, above n. 171.
176. Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, above n. 128, para. 42.
177. Ibid.
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chosocial (mental) disabilities – have encountered in the
past. The Court has even invoked the idea of group vul-
nerability in some cases to read positive obligations into
ECHR rights, which is positive in itself.178 However,
while the Court only made one reference to vulnerabili-
ty in Ðordević,179 it is arguable that employing the lan-
guage of vulnerability can be a double-edged sword in
the disability context: on the one hand, (potentially)
increasing protection for the individual concerned, and,
on the other hand, running the risk of leading to further
stigmatisation regarding the perceived inabilities of
people with disabilities.180 Moreover, the notion of
‘group vulnerability’ is at odds with the fact that the
CRPD adopts an empowering approach, focusing on
individual abilities and capabilities.
On the whole, Ðordević has been deemed an ‘important
and welcome’ judgment.181 It demonstrates that the
ECtHR will step in when no concrete or integrated
action to stop abusive behaviour is taken by domestic
authorities, and it underlines the proactive role that
state authorities should play to effectively counter hate
crimes against people with disabilities. As mentioned
above, however, harassment at the interpersonal level –
occurring in relations between private parties – will
require coordinated action from a variety of domestic
agencies, something which the Croatian authorities
themselves did not manage to do in this context.
4.3 Positive Duties in Strasbourg to Tackle
Employment-Based Discrimination?
The Strasbourg Court has also ruled on the severe
effects of prejudice and stereotypes at work in IB v.
Greece,182 which concerned the dismissal from employ-
ment of a man who had contracted the HIV virus, fol-
lowing a letter penned by 33 of his fellow employees
demanding his dismissal in order ‘to preserve their
health and their right to work’.183
Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicant claimed that
he had been the subject of stigmatisation on the part of
his colleagues, in that he ‘had been treated like a pariah
who should no longer be entitled to work’.184 He alleged
a violation of his right to private life under Article 8
ECHR, on account of the Court of Cassation’s ruling
that his dismissal on the ground of his HIV status was
lawful. The applicant also alleged discriminatory treat-
ment contrary to Article 14 ECHR on account of the
dismissal itself and the domestic Court’s reasoning that
it had been justified by the need to preserve a good
working environment.185
178. See ZH v. Hungary, ECHR (2012), Application no. 28973/11, para. 31.
See also para. 138 of Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155, where the
Court used similar language.
179. Ðordević v. Croatia, above n. 155, para. 138.
180. Ibid, for the Government’s submissions at para. 130, in contrast with
the Court’s approach at para. 138.
181. Roche, above n. 171.
182. IB v. Greece, ECHR (2013), Application no. 552/10.
183. Ibid., para. 10.
184. Ibid., para. 59.
185. Ibid., para. 48.
In finding a violation of both Articles 8 and 14 ECHR,
the Strasbourg Court once again adopted the group vul-
nerability approach. It ruled that, by virtue of the fact
that people living with HIV are a
vulnerable group with a history of prejudice and stig-
matisation, States should only be afforded a narrow
margin of appreciation in choosing measures that
[single] out that group for differential treatment on
the basis of their HIV status.186
The Court thereby extended its ruling in Kiyutin187 to a
dispute between private parties in I.B.
The Court failed to mention the CRPD in I.B.,
although it had ‘obvious relevance’ to the decision.188
Nonetheless, it is evident, as argued elsewhere,189 that
the CRPD’s social model approach to disability infiltra-
ted the Court’s analysis of the material scope of Article 8
ECHR. The Strasbourg Court ruled that the treatment
in question resulted in the applicant’s stigmatisation and
had ‘serious repercussions’ on his ‘personality rights,
the respect owed to him and, ultimately, his private
life’.190 Furthermore, in deciding that there was no
objective and reasonable justification for the treatment
in question, the ECtHR adopted a CRPD-compliant
approach (without drawing explicitly on the CRPD).191
This led the Court to narrow the margin of apprecia-
tion192 and resulted in a finding of discrimination on
account of the applicant’s health status, which the Court
held should be covered, either as a form of disability or
in the same way as a disability, under the term ‘other
status’ in Article 14 ECHR.193
Interestingly, the applicant claimed that ‘the circum-
stances of his dismissal’ did not render the principle of
positive obligations inapplicable per se.194 The Greek
government argued, however, that
neither Article 8, whether taken alone or in conjunc-
tion with Article 14, nor even Protocol No. 12
required member States to introduce legislation out-
lawing the dismissal of HIV-positive employees from
a post in the private sector.195
The Strasbourg Court sidestepped the issue of positive
obligations, noting that even if not all Council of Europe
member states have enacted specific legislation in favour
186. Ibid., paras. 79 and 81.
187. Kiyutin v. Russia, ECHR (2011), Application no. 2700/10, paras. 63-64.
See also Novruk and Others v. Russia, ECHR (2016), Applications no.
31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 and 13817/14.
188. Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at 331.
189. See A.Timmer, ‘HIV-based Employment Discrimination: The ECtHR
Takes a Strong Stance in I.B. v. Greece’, 21 October 2013, http://
strasbourgobservers.com/2013/10/21/hiv-based-employment-
discrimination-the-ecthr-takes-a-strong-stance-in-i-b-v-greece/ (last
visited 1 April 2020). See also Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at
331-332.
190. IB v. Greece, above n. 182, para. 72.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid., para. 81.
193. Ibid., para. 73.
194. Ibid., para. 59.
195. Ibid., para. 56.
124
ELR July 2020 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000166
of persons living with HIV, there is a ‘clear general ten-
dency towards protecting such persons from any discri-
mination in the workplace by means of more general
statutory provisions’.196
On the whole, Timmer is of the view that the I.B. judg-
ment ‘does not contain major innovations in the Court’s
Article 14 analysis’,197 and she points to the fact that the
legal reasoning does not provide much support for posi-
tive measures in the form of the duty to reasonably
accommodate the applicant if his health status had
actually diminished his ability to work.198
While the finding of disability-based discrimination, as
a result of stigmatisation, is an important finding by the
Strasbourg Court – in the sense that it seems to coun-
teract (among others) a form of ‘direct psycho-emotion-
al’ disablism199 that arises from various ‘acts of invalida-
tion’200 – the Court’s apparent lack of support for posi-
tive measures is indeed noteworthy. Those measures
have been deemed to constitute an essential component
in targeting aversive disablism. That form of disablism
may arise, according to Deal, in situations ‘whereby an
employer, through good intentions could decide not to
put a disabled employee under additional pressure by
exposing them to a new function or requiring them to
attend a stressful training event’, thereby placing the
employee ‘in a more vulnerable position with respect to
his/her career’.201
4.4 The Strasbourg Court and the Thorny Issue
of Legal Capacity: Adjudicating According
to ‘Best Interests’?
Another area in which the Strasbourg Court has been
confronted with disability prejudice and stereotyping
that can affect interpersonal relations is the field of legal
capacity. Three particularly recent and relevant cases in
that field are analysed below.202
A.-M.V. v. Finland203 concerned the complaint brought
before the ECtHR by a man with an intellectual dis-
ability regarding the refusal of the domestic courts to
replace his guardian, who had prevented him from
deciding where, and with whom, he would live. The
applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Article 8
ECHR. The Strasbourg Court referred to Article 12
CRPD and the CRPD Committee’s General Comment
No. 1, both of which relate to legal capacity. Notably,
the ECtHR remarked on the positive obligation of states
parties to the CRPD to ‘take action to develop laws and
policies to replace regimes of substitute decision-making
196. Ibid., para. 83.
197. Timmer (2013), above n. 189.
198. Ibid.
199. See generally D. Reeve, ‘Psycho-emotional Disablism and Internalised
Oppression’, in J. Swain, S. French, C. Barnes & C. Thomas (eds.), Disa-
bling Barriers – Enabling Environments (2014), at 92-98.
200. Ibid., at 93.
201. Deal, above n. 3, at 100.
202. See, in addition to the cases in this section, Shtukaturov v. Russia, ECHR
(2008), Application no. 44009/05; DD v. Lithuania, ECHR (2012),
Application no. 13469/06; Lashin v. Russia, ECHR (2013), Application
no. 33117/02; Stanev v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2012), Application no.
36760/06.
203. A.-M.V. v. Finland, ECHR (2017), Application no. 53251/13.
by supported decision-making, which respects the per-
son’s autonomy, will and preferences’.204 Notwithstand-
ing this, the Strasbourg Court held that there had been
no violation of Article 8 ECHR, since the applicant was
unable to understand the implications of the matter in
question. The Court implicitly applied a best interests
standard, which is based on prejudice and stereotypes
that people with disabilities are incapable, and is incom-
patible with Articles 12 and 23 CRPD. Moreover, Cojo-
cariu is of the view that the Court extended the scope of
the concept of ‘protection of health’ in Article 8(2) to
cover the woolly notion of “well-being”, in order to
accommodate interferences with the right to respect
for private life in the “best interests” of the person
concerned, beyond traditional concerns with harm to
self or others.205
A similar approach by the ECtHR was evidenced in the
later, 2018, case of Delecolle v. France.206 That case con-
cerned a wealthy elderly man who had been placed
under partial guardianship (curatelle renforcée) at the
request of his adoptive daughter and who was refused
permission to marry, since it was adjudged by the
domestic authorities that he (apparently) could not
understand the financial implications of this decision. In
his complaint to the ECtHR, the applicant argued that
his right to marry (contained in Article 12 ECHR) had
been infringed. The Strasbourg Court invoked the per-
mitted restrictions on that right – those of ‘generally
recognised public interest considerations’ – to rule that
the applicant was not ‘deprived’ of his right to marry,
but was merely required to obtain his guardian’s per-
mission to do so.207 The Court afforded the state a wide
margin of appreciation, reasoning that sufficient safe-
guards had been put in place and, ironically, that the
impugned measure was intended to promote his autono-
my.208 In that regard, Cojocariu argues that the Stras-
bourg Court did not engage with the facts of the case;
rather, it focused on the procedural safeguards available
to the applicant.209
Cojocariu rightly notes that the reasoning endorsed by
the Strasbourg Court was ‘impregnated with prejudice
against and paternalism towards elderly people and
people with disabilities’.210 What is particularly worry-
ing is the fact that the applicant’s adoptive daughter,
204. Ibid., paras. 42 et seq.
205. C. Cojocariu, ‘A.-M.V. v Finland. Independent Living: A Bridge Too Far
for the European Court of Human Rights’, Strasbourg Observers, 10
May 2017, https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/05/10/a-m-v-v-
finland-independent-living-a-bridge-too-far-for-the-european-court-of-
human-rights/ (last visited 1 April 2020).
206. Delecolle v. France, ECHR (2018), Application no. 37646/13.
207. Ibid., paras. 54, 60 and 62.
208. Ibid., para. 60.
209. C. Cojocariu, ‘Loneliness that is Good for you: The European Court
Addresses the Right to Marry of People with Disabilities’, Strasbourg
Observers, 3 December 2018, https://strasbourgobservers.com/
2018/12/03/loneliness-that-is-good-for-you-the-european-court-
addresses-the-right-to-marry-of-people-with-disabilities/ (last visited 1
April 2020).
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who initiated the partial guardianship procedure, was
apparently in the middle of a family conflict concerning
financial interests in the applicant’s property.211 Fur-
thermore, the guardianship regime was put in place
based on medical certificates that seemed to indicate
‘slight cognitive disorder’, ‘psychological fragilities’ and
‘some degree of vulnerability’,212 giving rise to the ques-
tion as to whether guardianship was a necessary measure
at all in this instance. Indeed, a medical report sought
during the domestic court proceedings stated that,
although he had an intellectual disability and was unable
to manage his property and finances, the applicant was
capable of consenting to marriage.213 Viewed in that
light, the Strasbourg Court’s judgment displays overtly
disablist reasoning. In her strong dissenting opinion,
Judge Nußberger cogently argued that the right to mar-
ry was disproportionally restricted in this case.214
There is no doubt that the Strasbourg Court’s standard
of review in Delecolle perpetuates the types of prejudices
and stereotypes that were evident at the national level.
By granting the state a wide margin of appreciation and
assuming that the domestic decisions were robust, with-
out applying a substantive standard of review, the
ECtHR did nothing to push states towards changing
hearts and minds.
By way of contrast to the findings in the aforementioned
cases, in the very recent case of Cînța v. Romania,215 the
ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 8
and Article 14 ECHR in the context of court-ordered
restrictions on the applicant’s contact with his daughter.
The Court found, in particular, that the domestic
authorities’ decisions to restrict the applicant’s contact
had been based partly on the fact that he had a psycho-
social disability (‘mental illness’). While the ECtHR
ruled that the fact that the applicant’s mental health fea-
tured in the courts’ assessment did not, in itself, raise an
issue under Article 14 ECHR, relying on mental illness
as the decisive element or even as one element among
others may amount to discrimination when, in the spe-
cific circumstances of the case, the mental illness does
not have a bearing on the individual’s ability to take care
of the child.216
Notably, the Court cited Article 12 CRPD (on legal
capacity) and even the CRPD’s human rights model of
disability and its model of inclusive equality.217 On the
whole, however, the Court’s decision, while positive in
its outcome, would not appear to be compatible with the
pronouncements of the CRPD Committee. According
to the Committee, ‘mental illness’ should not be a rele-
vant consideration at all in restricting an applicant’s
rights.
211. Delecolle v. France, above n. 206, paras. 11-12.
212. Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nußberger, referring to para. 9 of the
judgment.
213. Ibid. para. 9.
214. Delecolle v. France, above n. 206, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Nußberger.
215. Cînța v. Romania, ECHR (2019), Application no. 3891/19.
216. Ibid., para. 68.
217. Ibid., paras. 31-32.
Furthermore, and in contrast to the CRPD Committee,
the Strasbourg Court once again invoked the language
of vulnerability to justify ‘special consideration’ for the
rights of ‘mentally-ill persons’.218 By using the language
of vulnerability and that of mental illness (rather than
psychosocial disability, as the CRPD Committee219
does, representing the social construction of disability),
there is potential for further entrenchment of disablist
notions and behaviour in society. It is arguable that
ensuring CRPD-compliant language in court decisions
and, by extension, among the general public is some-
thing that only educational and training measures can
target.
5 Trends towards
Convergence or
Fragmentation in the
Approaches of the UN
Bodies and the Strasbourg
Court
Scrutiny of disability prejudice and stereotyping is in its
‘embryonic stages’.220 Nonetheless, preliminary remarks
concerning trends towards convergence or fragmenta-
tion in the approaches of the international and regional
bodies analysed can be made.
As this article has demonstrated, the CRPD Committee
has increased its references to the issues of prejudice
and stereotyping in its concluding observations; and has
proposed a mixed basket of legislative, funding and edu-
cational measures to tackle those issues. The Committee
maintains a particular focus on awareness-raising and
training measures, to be undertaken in conjunction with
people with disabilities (through their representative
organisations); and it also pushes states towards adopt-
ing legislative and individualised support measures. At
times, however, the CRPD Committee has been criti-
cised for its elaboration of ‘somewhat aspirational’221
(positive) state obligations in seeking to ensure the ful-
filment of certain rights, such as the right to legal
capacity.222
It cannot be ascertained whether the CRPD’s model of
inclusive equality has travelled across the gamut of the
international human rights treaty bodies. The data
available is currently not robust enough to be able to
detect definitive trends. Drawing on the one case of par-
ticular relevance in the context of this contribution –
218. Ibid., para. 77.
219. See CRPD Committee, above n. 68.
220. Cusack, above n. 7, at 23.
221. Cojocariu (2018), above n. 209.
222. See also O. Lewis, ‘Council of Europe’, in L. Waddington and A. Law-
son (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties in Practice. A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Courts (2018)
89, at 89.
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R.B.P. v. the Philippines – there appears to be a lack of
coherence and an inconsistent use of concepts between
the CRPD Committee and the CEDAW Committee
when it comes to intersectionality and vulnerability
analysis.
In relation to stereotyping, Cusack highlights that more
work is needed
to ensure that, wherever possible, UN mechanisms
seize opportunities to scrutinise disability stereotyp-
ing, and articulate the nature and scope of state obli-
gations to address such stereotyping, including its
compounded forms.223
He opines that the ‘leadership of the CRPD Committee
will be critical in this regard’.224
With regard to the CRPD and ECHR, ‘growing syner-
gies’ have emerged in the Strasbourg Court’s jurispru-
dence.225 The ECtHR has affirmed that it views the
CRPD as embracing ‘a European and worldwide con-
sensus on the need to protect people with disabilities
from discriminatory treatment’.226 As Lewis asserts, this
signals the Court’s view that the CRPD is ‘a globally
important direction-setting treaty’.227 The ECtHR has
increasingly drawn on the CRPD as an interpretive tool
to ECHR rights, and it has outlined a duty of reasonable
accommodation for contracting states in certain cases
concerning access to education. However, as scholars
point out, the Strasbourg Court has, to date, failed to
fully engage with the CRPD, particularly in the field of
legal capacity.228
By way of contrast with the UN treaty bodies, the Stras-
bourg Court has wavered in its approach to positive
state duties to tackle prejudice and stereotypes. In cer-
tain judgments, such as Ðordević, the Court lays empha-
sis on the importance of the obligation to protect, and
pays specific attention to the lack of policy decisions and
monitoring mechanisms to prevent further harassment.
This strong stance may be on account of the serious
nature of the acts in question and the extreme impunity
evident in the case. In other judgments, such as I.B., the
Court is less willing to step in to push states towards
changing hearts and minds, and seems to agree with the
domestic authorities that the ECHR does not require
member states to introduce legislation outlawing the
dismissal of HIV-positive employees in the private sec-
tor. The ECtHR has also retreated into the shadows in
other cases that raised the thorny issue of legal capacity,
such as A.-M.V. and Delecolle, according contracting
states a wide margin of appreciation and resorting to
limitation clauses on ECHR rights. This is not entirely
surprising since, as Lewis confirms, the Strasbourg
Court ‘departs significantly from the CRPD Commit-
tee’s insistence on legal capacity in all areas of life irre-
223. Cusack, above n. 7, at 23.
224. Ibid.
225. Ferri and Broderick, above n. 33, at 264.
226. Glor v. Switzerland, above n. 32, para. 53.
227. Lewis (2018), above n. 222, at 108.
228. Ibid. Ferri and Broderick, above n. 33.
spective of [the] nature or degree of disability or legal
capacity status’.229 This presumably stems from the
ECtHR’s concern regarding the degree of legitimacy
that it has vis-à-vis contracting states, a point which
Henrard has elaborated on in connection with the
Court’s use of ‘consensus analysis’ as a means of justify-
ing the appropriate level of scrutiny of restrictions.230
On the whole, Waddington affirms that the Strasbourg
Court seems to run ‘hot and cold’231 in its case law on
disability rights. In Delecolle, by way of contrast with
A.-M.V., for instance, the Court did not mention the
CRPD. According to Cojocariu,
with the Delecolle judgment, the Court reverts to an
uncertain trajectory in the area of disability, charac-
terised by a palpable inability to develop, and apply
consistently, a coherent set of principles on difficult
subjects such as legal capacity.232
Finally, a further area of fragmentation – not only
between the UN bodies themselves, but also between
the CRPD Committee and the ECtHR – relates to the
use of language. As pointed out in this article, the
ECtHR uses the language of vulnerability, in contrast to
the CRPD Committee, which uses, instead, empower-
ing language that emphasises capabilities. As argued
above, the ECtHR’s approach, while potentially
increasing the protection afforded to individual appli-
cants, arguably does not facilitate a change in hearts and
minds towards viewing persons with disabilities as
empowered individuals whose inherent capabilities
should be the focus of analysis. Moreover, it would
appear to run the risk of further entrenching aversive
disablism.
6 Conclusion
Timmer maintains that stereotypes are both a ‘cause and
manifestation’ of ‘structural disadvantage and discrimi-
nation’ against certain groups.233 This assertion rings
particularly true in the context of people with disabili-
ties, since deeply rooted systemic discrimination and
stereotypical attitudes about their capabilities and con-
tributions to society result in ‘barriers to being’ and
‘barriers to doing’.234
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Mégret claims that state involvement in preventing neg-
ative encroachments occurring in the private sphere
covers an ‘important dimension of the experience of
persons with disabilities’.235 The CRPD propelled the
issue of disability discrimination, including in the
interpersonal domain, into international human rights
law. By endorsing the human rights model of disability
and the inclusive model of equality, the CRPD requires
states to ‘delve deeper into the realm of equality law to
grant disabled citizens a right of equal access to all areas
of life’.236 Since attitudinal barriers are one of the most
difficult barriers to eradicate,237 the CRPD imposes
numerous positive obligations on states parties targeted
at removing attitudinal barriers that are at the core of
the marginalisation of people with disabilities.
This article has, to borrow the words of Perlin, analysed
how far states should (and can) go to capture the hearts
and minds of the public, in order to ensure that the
rights of people with disabilities ‘are incorporated –
freely and willingly – into the day-to-day fabric and
psyche of society’.238 As noted in the introduction, this
article primarily addresses jurisprudence which relates
to prejudice and stereotypes that occur in relations
between private parties, but it also discusses disablism,
which – directly or indirectly – affects the exercise of
the rights of people with disabilities in the interpersonal
sphere.
As demonstrated throughout this article, the inter-
national human rights treaty bodies are like brave older
siblings, stepping out into the unknown – without con-
straints – to pronounce a range of positive measures to
be adopted by states parties, with a view to engaging in
‘social engineering’. On the other hand, the Strasbourg
Court imposes self-restraint and has recourse to the lim-
its of its mandate whenever it is confronted with
particularly contentious issues.
A mixture of positive duties, including legislative meas-
ures, have been considered appropriate by the UN trea-
ty bodies to eliminate prejudice and stereotypes. How-
ever, as demonstrated above, discrimination that affects
interpersonal relations – particularly discrimination that
occurs between private parties – can be difficult to regu-
late. Furthermore, while effective safeguards can, and
should, be adopted – ranging from a review of state poli-
cies and legal frameworks, to a review of the capacity
available to monitor violations – wholesale reliance on
the law is not desirable. This is because legislation, poli-
cies and institutional structures often mirror value-laden
(disabling) social conventions and attitudes that emerge
in a particular society. Moreover, while law can serve as
an important tool in compelling individuals and groups
to change their behaviour (and can sometimes lead to
235. F. Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of
Rights’, 12 The International Journal of Human Rights 261, at 266
(2008).
236. Broderick (2015), above n. 15, at 139.
237. Bariffi, above n. 107, at 230.
238. M.L. Perlin, ‘The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?’, 8 Journal of Law and Health 15, at 22
(1993-1994).
changes in hearts and minds over time), there is often a
backlash against coercive measures.
Beyond legal measures, awareness raising and training
(including in relation to language that potentially
inflames prejudice and stereotypes) is required. These
measures must target all relevant societal actors,
particularly those involved in rights adjudication,
including judges and prosecutors. It must be noted,
however, that such measures have their limitations, as
addressed throughout this article. In addition, as Bariffi
acknowledges,
governmental commitment to conduct effective
awareness raising policies to promote a positive image
of persons with disabilities is scarce and generally
guided by the prevalence of the medical model of dis-
ability.239
To result in genuine changes to hearts and minds, Sol-
stad Vedeler et al. are of the view that ‘transformative
strategies’240 are more appropriate. The authors argue
that awareness-raising activities are not sufficient; rath-
er, drawing on Fraser’s theories of social justice, they
affirm that there ‘continues to be a profound need to
increase the redistribution of resources in order to facili-
tate an increase in educational achievement and employ-
ment participation’.241 Steadily increasing the level of
participation and inclusion of people with disabilities in
mainstream structures in society – education, employ-
ment, political and cultural life, among others – facili-
tates intergroup contact. Thus, societal structures need
to be changed. In turn, affective ties can be built and
strengthened. This should, at the very least, result in
changing hearts, although the cognitive dimension of
prejudice may take longer to tackle.
Ultimately, states cannot be ‘forced’ to change hearts
and minds, but a desire to effect change can seep into
the collective conscience (and into political will), in par-
ticular through the efforts of civil society. Essentially,
more inclusion and participation of people with disabili-
ties themselves and their representative orgranisations is
needed in policy processes.242 Their inclusion at all lev-
els is necessary, among other reasons, to challenge the
depictions of disability that are contained in popular
culture, certain religions and in historical and medical
accounts of disability. As Bariffi points out, ‘the system
of values, beliefs, traditions, and the social image about
disability which is built at individual, community, and
media levels sets the groundwork for any possible social
change’.243
In its 2018 general comment on equality, the CRPD
Committee affirmed that the efforts by states parties ‘to
overcome attitudinal barriers to disability have been
239. Bariffi, above n. 107, at 244.
240. J. Solstad Vedeler, T. Olsen & J. Eriksen, ‘Hate Speech Harms: A Social
Justice Discussion of Disabled Norwegians’ Experiences’, 34(3) Dis-
ability and Society 368, at 380 (2019).
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242. CRPD Committee, General Comment 7 on Participation, UN Doc.
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243. Bariffi, above n. 107, at 230.
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insufficient’, and that ‘enduring and humiliating stereo-
types, and stigma of and prejudices against persons with
disabilities as being a burden on society’ remain.244
Courts and quasi-adjudicatory bodies can play a role in
pushing states towards facilitating change in this regard.
The international and regional treaty bodies and courts
need to develop a coherent body of jurisprudence that
can be translated into concrete action at the domestic
level. Ultimately, however, it is only by increasing the
participation and inclusion of people with disabilities in
every aspect of society that states can target the root
causes of prejudice, stereotypes and ‘othering’ that per-
sist. This is wholly in line with the CRPD’s model of
inclusive equality.
244. General Comment 6, above n. 48, para. 2.
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